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Abstract:  The provision and location of critical urban infrastructure (i.e. energy, water, transport and 
communications) are intimately connected with national security ambitions around settlement growth and 
development. Yet despite a broader ‘infrastructure turn’ within Australian cities (see Dodson, 2009), a 
detailed understanding of how and why critical urban infrastructure becomes framed as a key security 
issue has been little explored within Australian urban research.  This paper positions the (national) 
security focus around critical urban infrastructure in critical tension with growing parallel imperatives for 
democratic governance processes that are able to reduce social vulnerability and build community 
resilience. Better understanding the democratic possibilities and dimensions of this agenda include a 
focus on the important role of non-state actors and empowerment of those most marginalised within the 
Australian city context. 
 
Introduction 
Nearly 70 per cent of the Australian population lives in the five largest cities, which are now recognized as 
having or nearing world city or global city status (Kubler & Randolph, 2009). These cities act as significant 
international nodes for economic, political and cultural exchanges within and through which the 
contemporary configurations of critical urban infrastructure intersect. The provision, location and 
connectedness of critical urban infrastructure (e.g. energy, water, food, transport and communications) 
are intimately linked with notions of human security, ambitions around settlement growth and fundamental 
to the sustainable development of Australia’s burgeoning metropolitan regions.  
 
Whilst infrastructure can be understood as “the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the 
functioning of a community or society, such as transportation and communications systems, water and 
power lines, and public institutions including schools, post offices, and prisons” (Moteff and Paformak, 
2004, p.1). Critical infrastructure embodies a more relational framework of interconnected networks and 
services: 
…comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities 
that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the 
United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a whole (Clinton, 1996, p.1). 
 
Within cities critical infrastructure is recognized as a key transmitter of risk and vulnerability within cities, 
yet there has been a lack of urban attentiveness to infrastructure within the Australian city context. The 
politics of addressing these problems involve three fragmented tiers of government (local, state and 
national), a range of domestic interests, as well as international forces. These problems affect different 
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parts of the city to different degrees, contributing to broader patterns that shape the spatial distribution of 
urban poverty, inequality and disadvantage.  
 
Yet despite what has been described as a broader ‘infrastructure turn’ to planning within cities (see 
Dodson, 2009), critical and/or detailed understandings of the interlinkages between infrastructure 
governance, security and socio-political dynamics have been little explored within Australian urban 
research. The absence of any substantive discussion about the relational role of urban infrastructure – 
critical or otherwise – is for example a glaring omission in the otherwise excellent and authoritative book 
on Australian cities by Clive Forster (2004). In many ways this is indicative of a much deeper failing within 
Australian city and planning literature that largely marginalizes infrastructure systems and networks as the 
purview of engineers and technicians. For Phillip O’Neill (2009, p.1) the Australian infrastructure crisis is 
‘as much a crisis of ideas about infrastructure that requires new thinking and new approaches in the 21
st
 
century’.  
 
This paper has three aims that guide the structure and content that follows. The first is to highlight the 
complexity of critical infrastructure as a security and governance agenda and the implications of this for 
Australian cities. Building on this the second part of the paper asks what is critical about critical 
infrastructure drawing on a human security approach on critical urban infrastructure that seeks to reduce 
social vulnerability and build community resilience. The third section of the paper offers the framework of 
sovereignty vs. security as an alternative approach to thinking about critical urban infrastructure as the 
basis for research. The emphasis on a community-based approach to critical infrastructure (i.e. food 
sovereignty) challenges the dominant positivist approach to infrastructure as a national security and/or 
technical or engineering issue. We conclude the paper by highlighting that not all ways of governing 
critical infrastructure are equal. 
 
Framing critical infrastructure 
Infrastructure networks shape and sustain our cities, as well as render them exposed and vulnerable to a 
wide range of security threats such as natural disasters, terrorism, peak oil and climate change (Graham, 
2010). In Australia national ambitions for long-term city resilience are realized through the securitization of 
critical urban infrastructure. The national position around the importance of securitising critical 
infrastructure has been made clear in The Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (2010, p.8) which 
states:  
The Australian Government recognizes the importance of critical infrastructure, including those parts that 
provide essential services for everyday life (such as energy, food, water, transport, communications, health 
and banking and finance). A disruption to critical infrastructure could have a range of serious implications for 
business (including other critical infrastructure), governments and the community.  
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The logic of securitisation differs from a risk management approach which deploys a preventative focus 
on the potential rather than the concreteness of any given security act or threat. The intent of the risk 
management rationale is pre-emptive through measurement, evaluation and other actuarial methods of 
risk surveillance, control or reduction. As Foucault (1978 cited in van Munster, 2005, p.7) observes, risk 
management “does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his 
obedient subjects; it effects the distributions around the norm”. The processes of securitisation are thus a 
political choice and act. A sense of political community is re-established and the “we-ness” and societal 
identity powerfully reinforced (Williams, 2003, p.518).  
 
The official position around the importance of critical infrastructure follows the national security imperative 
developed by the US government as a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Moteff, 2004). The 
policy to protect this infrastructure was framed in the National Strategy for the Physical Infrastructure 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (U.S Government 2003, p. 6), which includes one of 
the first definitions on critical infrastructure: 
 
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction 
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety. 
 
The US national strategy located these systems and assets in the areas considered vital for the nation’s 
progress, such as energy, water, transportation and food/agriculture (US Government, 2003). These 
sectors are considered ‘lifelines’ and, in this sense, critical urban infrastructures become ‘the arteries and 
veins of Western, urbanized societies’ (De Bruijne and Van Eeten, 2007, p. 18). The majority of these 
urban infrastructure ‘lifelines’ are owned and operated by the private sector, following the neoliberal trend 
of privatising public assets. Privatisation marked a shift from centralised public monopolies to private and 
public structures operating in competitive markets, leading to an increased ‘splintering’ in the governance 
of urban infrastructure (Graham and Marvin, 2001).  
 
In the Australian urban context given the proportion of the population living in cities, there is a recognised 
need for better governance frameworks in the management of critical infrastructure (Hodson, 2010). This 
is problematized by the governance deficit in Australian cities with no clear status or voice within the 
Australian federal system and little political recognition. This deficit takes three principal forms: 1) an 
absence of governance frameworks for the nation’s extensive urban regions displaces metropolitan 
political ambition and activity to local and state levels; 2) episodic and piecemeal interest of the 
Commonwealth in urban affairs; and 3) neo-liberal reform, in concert with technological and institutional 
change, which has given new status and influence to private interests, especially in the field of 
infrastructure and urban management systems (Steele & Gleeson, 2010).  
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In the United States this institutional fragmentation has been dealt mainly through Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) where the government and the private sector partner to monitor and control 
infrastructure operations. In Australia the Commonwealth government relies on a PPP approach for 
national infrastructure provision and supply security. The importance of the PPP is clearly outlined in 
Australian national policy which states that ‘a business-government partnership is the foundation of the 
Australian Government’s approach to critical infrastructure resilience’ (Australian Government, 2010, p. 
17). The governance of infrastructure is seen at the national level as a shared responsibility between the 
federal government, the private sector, and State and Territory governments (TISN, 2013).  
 
According to the Australian Government Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (2010, p.4), “a 
significant proportion of Australia’s critical infrastructure is privately owned or operated on a commercial 
basis”. The Australian government currently relies predominantly on a non-regulatory approach based on 
the acceptance that the private sector is in better position of securing the infrastructure assets (Australian 
Government, 2010). There is a tension however between delegating between business logic and public 
matters of national security. The benefits can be seen in the recommendations for improving the 
governance of the food sector as a consequence of the 2011 Queensland floods, which state that 
regulations should not obstruct business capacity to respond to disasters (Australian Government, 2012). 
However this can also lead to confusion about the roles assumed by the government, as was identified in 
the analysis of the Melbourne heat wave of 2009: is the government policymaker, regulator or service 
provider? (see McEvoy et. al. 2012).  
 
In order to support this coalition of PPP interests the exchange of resources and information is managed 
via the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for Critical Infrastructure Resilience. The TISN is 
overseen by the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) and includes the main sectors of infrastructure for 
Australia: energy, water, food, telecommunications, transport, health and banking (Australian 
Government, 2013). The main objective of the TISN is to share information about the threats and 
vulnerabilities of infrastructure. In this context, the government depends on the willingness of private 
actors to collaborate but must take steps to ensure commercial and public interests are protected. The 
need to protect both vulnerable public infrastructure and the commercial in-confidence of private sector 
assets raises a number of democratic tensions. 
 
Similar to the US, the Australian government has adopted restrictive public information policies to foster 
the co-operation of the private operators in the protection of critical infrastructure assets. In the US, for 
example, private industries supporting critical infrastructure have since 2002 been made exempt from the 
Freedom of Information Act (Uhl, 2004). In Australia access to public information about infrastructure is 
restricted by the Australian Freedom of Information Act which even though it does not mention critical 
infrastructure explicitly, exempts from disclosure the documents affecting national security or 
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commercially valuable information (Australian Government, 1982). With respect to restricted access to 
critical information, knowledge and resources, the approach to critical infrastructure via PPP’s reflects a 
tension between the logic of security and due democratic processes that are able support public 
accountability, transparency and legitimacy and build community confidence (Dunn-Cavelty and Suter, 
2009).  
 
What’s critical about critical infrastructure?1 
Understanding what is critical in urban infrastructure and the potential vulnerabilities frames the urban 
response. Infrastructure is critical due to the services it provides – food, water, electricity or transport− 
and the potential negative impact upon a nation and its communities if these services are disrupted. For 
instance, a disruption in the energy sector or a breakdown in the water system leading to impacts on 
public health and safety (Moteff et. al. 2003). Another factor that adds criticality is the degree of 
interdependency and interconnectedness of the networks and systems that comprise urban infrastructure, 
including the environment where they operate, framed by policies, regulations, markets and resource 
availability  (Rinaldi et al. 2001; De Bruijne and Van Eeten, 2007; Kröger, 2008). This is common in 
metropolitan areas, where two or more infrastructures are correlated and influence each other in an 
environment where multiple tiers of government interact. For example, electricity generation systems 
support the telecommunications and transport sectors while water infrastructure supports food and 
energy production.  
 
Urban society’s vulnerability depends then on ‘critical nodes’ that comprise the critical infrastructure 
system (Orwat, Buscher and Raabe, 2010). The interdependent nature makes urban infrastructures more 
vulnerable to external impacts, leading to what is known as ‘cascading effects’, where a disturbance 
propagates rapidly among infrastructures of different sectors (Rinaldi et al. 2001). An example of this is a 
power crisis where electricity shortages coupled with blackouts can affect oil and gas production as well 
as water provision. In the last decade, the danger of propagation has increased due to the information 
technologies that make modern infrastructures operate, making them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The 
fear of critical infrastructure collapse or disruption and the impact of this on Australian cities have led to 
the rendering of infrastructure invisible as part of a national security agenda. As Stephen Graham (2010, 
p.10) describes infrastructure networks become “the forgotten, the background, the frozen in place” 
unless crisis/disaster strikes and their importance and vulnerabilities are publicly (and painfully) exposed. 
 
Criticality is thus a function of importance and vulnerability, which is aggravated by the fact that most of 
the infrastructure in urban areas is geographically concentrated due to settlement growth and 
development policies that promote scale economies and natural resource exploitation (Parfomak, 2005). 
                                                 
1
 Thanks to Professor Steve Dovers (Fenner School, ANU) for posing this question in personal communication highlighting the 
critical role and importance of natural ecosystems –see forthcoming paper 2014 with this title). 
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Whilst there is no definitive criterion for defining what makes infrastructure critical there are two 
perceptions that behind criticality: systemic and symbolic. The first is given by the interdependence of 
infrastructures while the latter is defined by the socio-political role in society that critical infrastructure 
holds (Brunner, 2008). Both the systemic and symbolic perceptions highlight that it is impossible to 
separate out people, place and politics when cataloguing the threats and vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructure, as well as the public importance and progressive possibilities.  
 
Infrastructure sovereignty vs. security? 
New directions in non-traditional security studies have sought to re-frame security as a positive or 
constructive agenda that can hold emancipatory goals challenging “the restrictive understanding of 
national security that has dominated realist theories...for a more comprehensive framework for 
understanding security that takes human well-being and ecosystem integrity, rather than states, as the 
fundamental moral and analytical reference point” (Eckersley, 2004, p. 256). This includes a shift away 
from early militarized preoccupations with securitization in favour of alternative modes expressed through 
deliberative democracy, education, and the values of compassion and community care (Dobson, 2004).  
 
From a human security perspective, a focus on the complex democratic dimensions of critical urban 
infrastructure includes consideration of the national role but only as part of the broader human-centred 
democratic system necessarily underpinned by progressive and deliberative ethical values and criteria. 
For Barnett and Adger (2007, p.64) human security can be understood as “a function of multiple 
processes operating across space, over time, and at multiple scales. Whilst Smith & Whelan (2008, p.1) 
argue a case for the inclusion of human security in strategic guidance as they believe it “presents an 
opportunity for Australia to embrace a more holistic approach to security that can accommodate the 
vulnerabilities of both the individual and the state, as well as help achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals”. 
Central to the human security approach are calls for more imaginative responses to security threats, the 
need to learn from previous security decisions embraced, and to include non-state, sub and supra-state 
levels of security ambition and activity that expand the narrow state centric approach in the face of 
contemporary challenges. Climate change for example is expected to alter the frequency of extreme 
weather events such as droughts, bushfires, storm surges, cyclones and hail. This is expected to 
increase damage to infrastructure, disrupt key services, increase insurance costs, increase risk to human 
life including respiratory disease, heat stress, post-event disease outbreaks and other health-related 
impacts.  
 
A human security approach emphasizes protection and empowerment of those most vulnerable. The 
focus is on “a state that is achieved when individuals and communities have the options necessary to 
end, mitigate or adapt to threats to their human, environmental and social rights; have the capacity and 
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freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in pursuing these options” (GECHS 1999 cited 
in O’Brien, Sygna and Wolf 2013, p.1).  As Ogato and Sen (2003, p.2) highlight in Human Security – Now, 
the United Nations Independent Commission on Human Security Report human security holds a three-
fold focus: (i) protecting people from menaces (i.e. climate change); (ii) recognition of the important role of 
non-state actors; and (iii) an emphasis on empowerment for those who are marginalized. They use the 
case study of hunger to highlight the importance of a human security approach to food. 
 
Having access to adequate food affects people’s ability to participate in all spheres of econom ic, political and 
social life and move out of chronic poverty […] Food insecurity and hunger undermine a person’s dignity and 
well-being. A country’s ability to produce and procure enough food for its people to avoid hunger and 
malnutrition is critical to human security (Ogata & Sen 2003, p.14). 
 
Within the urban context the human security approach to critical infrastructure reorients the focus away 
from national security protection and private-sector investment towards how individuals and communities 
best maintain and enhance their short/long term access to adequate supplies of basic needs such as 
energy, water and food. It also increases the importance of interconnectedness of key areas such as 
communications, public transport and information availability via a people/earth-centred approach. In this 
way the larger geo-political/eco-political contexts of energy and water for example intersect with concerns 
around human security and justice. Within such a framework the role of civil society are understood as 
more than simply “an artefact of statist ontology” but as both system-reforming and system transforming 
agencies (Gale, 1998, p.345). 
 
Purcell (2003) identifies few characteristics in regards to the right to the city that resonates with the 
human security approach to critical infrastructure. He states that the right to the city sets the principles for 
a different form of citizenship where the principle of inhabitance will define the membership of the 
citizenship. In regards to the rights, the inhabitants will have “the right to appropriate urban space and the 
right to participate centrally in the production of urban space” (p 577). They will also hold a say in 
decisions related to critical infrastructure. The inhabitants will be at the centre and decisions are made as 
much through deliberation among inhabitants, rather than through PPP-style negotiation between capital 
and the state.  
 
The right to the city can potentially lead to a more democratic system characterized by debate among 
inhabitants about the structure and purpose of global political economy leading to action. Lefebvre (1981, 
p.34) observes that the right to the city is “the right to information, the rights to use of multiple services, 
the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in urban areas”. For 
critical urban infrastructure this links to the new human security support and calls for: 
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… new, transformative approaches to research, policy and action. The focus on transformative processes 
recognizes a compelling need for change … an explicit recognition of the spatial, temporal and social dynamics 
between threats and responses…responding from a different action logic it becomes possible to identify 
actionable and effective leverage points for systems transformations towards sustainability (p.2-4).  
 
Thus, just as food sovereignty is ‘embedded in larger questions of social justice and the rights of 
communities to control their own futures and make their own decisions’ (Zerbe 2013, p.1) as opposed to 
traditional questions of national food supply and security, larger questions need to be asked about our 
approach to critical infrastructure in research, policy and action. Food sovereignty has evolved as a 
powerful grassroots political concept associated with human and environmental rights and localized 
action. This is described as “the right to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food and food-
producing resources and the ability for communities to sustain themselves and their societies” (Forum for 
Food Sovereignty, 2007, p.1).  
 
How then might our approach to critical urban infrastructure shift if we were to think in terms of energy 
and water sovereignty for example rather than national PPP energy and water style security? Can we 
conceive of socio-political conditions that would lead to transport and communications sovereignty that 
emphasizes the right to the city through a different security logic? What opportunities would unfold if 
critical urban infrastructure in Australia was framed at heart as a focus on: people; values and ethics; 
localized systems; principles of subsidiarity; building skills and knowledge; and a commitment to working 
with, not against, nature?
2
 What would our cities be like then? 
 
Conclusion  
The provision and location of critical urban infrastructure (i.e. energy, water, transport and 
communications) are intimately connected with ambitions around settlement growth and development. 
The problems of critical infrastructure stress, resource availability (especially water) and climate change 
present a challenge to the resilience of the urban system. Yet not all ways of presenting security threats 
are appropriate; not all ways of governing the security of critical infrastructure in cities are equal. Given 
the concentration of the population and its polities in metropolitan areas this is no small consideration, 
and the significance of urban decision making for welfare and well-being intersects with critical 
infrastructure at every scale. 
 
Through the security lens the focus of research is on who is promoting security measures and how these 
policies form part of broader political projects and visions. Australia’s concept of critical infrastructure 
encompasses national security rhetoric by defining it as:  
 
                                                 
2
 Guiding principles developed at the Forum for Food Sovereignty, Nyeleni (2007) 
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Those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks that, if 
destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social 
or economic well-being of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure 
national security (Australian Government 2010, p. 8) 
 
In this way Australia follows the national security imperative framed by the US for the protection of critical 
infrastructure in its urban areas which emphasizes the physical security of its assets as the way to 
achieve urban resilience, largely managed and administered through a PPP constortium. The national 
security aim and the way infrastructure is governed as a result, concedes a high priority to business 
interests as they are the owners and operators of most of the infrastructure within the Australian city 
context.  The danger is that this kind of security is a double-edged sword that can undermine the most 
basic principles of civil rights and democracy (Brown, 2007). 
 
This paper has focused on highlighting the disjuncture between the (national) security imperative for 
critical urban infrastructure and the growing parallel imperatives for democratic governance processes 
that are able to reduce social vulnerability and build community resilience. Better understanding the 
democratic possibilities and dimensions of this agenda within the context of the current Australian 
metropolitan governance deficit includes a focus on the role of non-state actors and empowerment of 
those most marginalized. In this sense what is ‘critical’ is not just recognition of the vulnerability and 
interconnectedness of critical urban infrastructure systems – although this is important - but greater 
critical recognition of the deep links between critical infrastructure systems and human and environmental 
integrity and welfare. Infrastructure research, policy and action must make this agenda public and explicit. 
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